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RECONSTRUCTING THE ORIGINS OF
REALISTIC JURISPRUDENCE: A PREQUEL TO
THE LLEWELLYN-POUND EXCHANGE OVER
LEGAL REALISM
N.E.H. HULL*
I am no historian and this paper does not purport to be history.
Rather, it is an appeal for history. It is a sad commentary on our
dogmatics that sales cases over a hundred and fifty years and more
than fifty jurisdictions have been treated as if they floated free of time,
place and person. Whereas it is time, place, person and circumstance
which give them meaning. A few major trends are here presented. But
not as history. History calls for detailed knowledge, for detailed back-
ground, and for discrimination even more detailed.-Karl Llewellyn"
INTRODUCTION
You may have heard this story before; everyone who goes to law
school is exposed to some variant of it. During the first half of the twen-
tieth century, American Jurisprudence found its own voice. Breaking
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1. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 CoL. L. REV. 699, 699 n.* (1936).
2. Legal thought, philosophy, or Jurisprudence was once defined as "any thoughtful generaliz-
ing about anything that has a legal reference for the purpose of which reaches beyond solving the
case of next Tuesday." TRANSCRIPT OF K. LLEWELLYN'S JURISPRUDENCE LECTURES AT UNIVER-
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from their predecessors' subservience to British and continental jurispru-
dents, a cadre of American law professors, bravely marching under the
battle flag of "Legal Realism," lured the dragon of legal formalism from
its cave. In heroic combat that echoed through the pages of the Colum-
bia Law Review and the Harvard Law Review, 3 St.-George-the-Legal -
Realist slew the dragon of formalism by proving that judges did not fol-
low the rules they said they were following. The Legal Realists revealed
Legal Formalism to be a sham, a "style of reasoning' 4 masking personal
and policy preferences. On the field of their triumph, the Legal Realists
deployed a new theory of how courts and judges worked. Realist theore-
ticians, riding off boldly in many directions, called for a commitment to
the social scientific study of how courts worked, a behavioral or psycho-
logical explanation of the way the legal system functioned, a skepticism
about the received wisdom of legal principles and rules-particularly
those that claimed to cover every case-and a passionate belief in replac-
ing an impersonal, formalistic legal structure with one conforming to a
functional reality.5 The end of the story is both comforting and fitting:
we are all realists now.6
SITY OF CHICAGO SCHOOL OF LAW, KARL LLEWELLYN PAPERS [hereinafter Llewellyn Papers]
C.F.3. This is what I call Jurisprudence with an uppercase J There is also a jurisprudence with a
lower casej, the legal philosophy implicit in judges' opinions, lawyers' briefs, and legislators' stat-
utes. Jurisprudence, with a large J is conscious and serious thought about the law and touches on
political theory, social and political history, and most other areas of humanist or social science
study. Of course, the philosophizing and dissection carried on by law professors, political scientists,
and philosophers can and has had an impact on jurisprudence with the lower casej and consequently
on our social and political system generally.
3. The famous Realist debate between Karl Llewellyn and Roscoe Pound was carried on in
three articles in those two journals. See Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30
COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Next Step]; Pound, The Call for a Realist Juris-
prudence, 44 HARV. L. REv. 697 (1931); Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism, A Reply to Dean
Pound, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1222 (1931) [Hereinafter Llewellyn, Reply]. For a detailed look at the
debate, see Hull, Some Realism about the Llewellyn-Pound Exchange over Realism: The Newly Un-
covered Private Correspondence, 1927-1931, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 921.
4. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960).
5. The secondary literature analyzing these aspects of Legal Realism is extensive. See, e.g., L.
KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-60 (1986); W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM:
SKEPTICISM, REFORM, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1968); Bloustein, Logic and Legal Realism:
The Realist as a Frustrated Idealist, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 24 (1964); Schlegel, American Legal Realism
and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 459 (1979); Schlegel,
American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular Case of Underhill Moore, 29
BUFF. L. REv. 195 (1980).
6. The conventional story is most often promulgated by law teachers and legal text writers,
not legal historians. Grant Gilmore credits the school of Legal Realism with making "a clean sweep
of the errors of the past." Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L. J. 1037, 1037
(1961). He posits the beginning of the revolution with Holmes and then jumps to the Realists as the
critics of nineteenth-century Jurisprudence. He never mentions Roscoe Pound. Id. at 1039. An-
other influential article recounting the conventional story appears in a popular anthology often as-
signed to law students. Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF
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If we were all "post-structuralists, ' ' 7 content with an account of the
origins of legal realism that transcended the original actors to live on its
own, there would be no reason to revise the conventional account. Much
"legal history," particularly the legal history taught in law school classes,
operates at this level. And that makes sense because law professors em-
ploy legal history in the classroom to introduce and define the contours
of legal doctrine. Insofar as legal doctrine is taught in an abstract and
acontextual way, so "legal history" is extracted from historical fact. In
this acontextualization of "legal history," the law professors have com-
pany. Today many intellectual historians, borrowing from post-struc-
tural schools of literary criticism, have adopted an acontextual canon.
"[L]iterature has returned to history," writes David Harlan, "unfurling
her circus silks of metaphor and allegory, misprision and aporia, trace
and sign, demanding that historians accept her mocking presence right at
the heart of what they had once insisted was their own autonomous and
truly scientific discipline."8 This approach to the history of ideas di-
vorces them from the actual discourse, the exchange of words and sym-
bols among living thinkers. It runs the risk of turning historical
protagonists into cyphers, names attached to categories. 9 That is a risk
LAW 18-39 (D. Kairys ed. 1982). Mensch periodizes twentieth-century Jurisprudence thus: Classi-
cal Legal Consciousness (1885-1935), followed by The Realist Challenge (1920-1939), followed by
Attempts at Modern Reconstruction (1940-Present). Id. at 23, 26, 29. Again, Pound and his Progres-
sive-Pragmatic colleagues are largely ignored. Variations of this story also appear in standard texts,
such as C. KNAPP & N. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 10-11
(2d ed. 1987) (Pound and sociological jurisprudence dismissed in a single sentence followed by long
description of Legal Realists that could have been applied equally to Pound and his Progressive-
Pragmatic contemporaries); G. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND READINGS ON THE PHI-
LOSOPHY OF LAW 645-752 (1973). Professor Christie devotes an entire chapter, Part Two: Modern
Legal Philosophy to Legal Realism. According to Professor Christie, the first Realist Jurisprudent is
Holmes, followed by Herman Oliphant, Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jerome Frank, and Karl Llewellyn.
There is a note on the Debate between Llewellyn and Pound, but not a single selection from Pound's
work is included.
7. Art Berman defines the post-structualist approach thus: "In post-structuralism, knowledge
of the world derives from the interaction between a primary, originally contentless, subjectivity and a
language that pre-exists the user of it... all truth is eventually undermined." FROM THE NEW
CRITICISM TO DECONSTRUCTION, THE RECEPTION OF STRUCTURALISM AND POST-STRUCTURAL-
ISM 173-74 (1988). In other words, post-structuralism is anti-realistic and subjective in a sense that
would deny traditional contextualist history. See also papers and comments presented at the confer-
ence, "Realism and Representation," November 10-12, 1989, on file at the Rutgers University
Center for the Critical Analysis of Contemporary Culture.
8. Harlan, Intellectual History and the Return of Literature, 94 AM. HIST. REV. 581, 581
(1989).
9. Harlan acknowledges that the deconstructionist or post-structuralist linguistic approach to
intellectual history has attracted a significant backlash of contextualist critics, including J.G.A.
Pocock, Quentin Skinner, and David Hollinger. Id. at 583. Hollinger, indeed, published a reply to
Harlan in the same issue of the American Historical Review in which he refutes Harlan's claim that
the post-structuralists now dominate the field of intellectual history. See Hollinger, The Return of
the Prodigal: The Persistence of Historical Knowing, 94 Am. HisT. REV. 610, 620-21 (1989) ("Trends
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we should avoid; there already are enough abstract categories and dehu-
manized doctrines in legal scholarship.
Seen from a contextualist perspective, the conventional story of
Legal Realism's birth is wrong.10 That is to say, once we abandon the
post-structuralist position, we are able to ask a series of questions that we
could not ask before. These questions drive us deep into the exchange of
ideas among legal scholars at a particular point in time. They are ques-
tions whose answers tell us why these scholars argued as they did and
what they meant to tell each other. Research into the manuscripts of
Roscoe Pound, Karl Llewellyn, and John Henry Wigmore, reveals a dif-
ferent and highly human account of the origins of Legal Realism.
In broad outline, the story should read: in the first three decades of
the twentieth century, legal academics fashioned an autonomous, indige-
nous jurisprudential movement, but it was not, at least at first, Legal
Realism. Instead, a group of law professors, jurists, and philosophers,
led or at least inspired by Dean Roscoe Pound of Harvard Law School,
in literary theory do come and go with some rapidity . . . 'but the thing now is post-
poststructuralism.' ").
10. While the conventional story is popular and dominates general consciousness, there have
been scholars who, to varying degrees, recognized the intermediate movement of Pound and his
generation. Harold Reuschlein, Thomas Cowan, and Edgar Bodenheimer of the generation contem-
porary to or immediately following the Realists tried to give Pound and the other pre-Realist
pragmatists their due. Reuschlein, in the section of his book dealing with Our Contemporaries, starts
with the Fatherhood of Holmes, followed by The Pre-Emptive Roscoe Pound, then deals with Harlan
Fiske Stone, Arthur T. Vanderbilt, and John Henry Wigmore and Albert Kocourek and the
Pragmatists (primarily John Dewey) in several smaller sections, and then deals with the Realists. H.
REUSCHLEIN, JURISPRUDENCE: ITS AMERICAN PROPHETS 95-274 (1951). Cowan, for example,
treats The Realists as one subcategory in his chapter on Sociological Jurisprudence. T. COWAN, THE
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE READER 157-89 (1956). Bodenheimer, while giving Pound's sociologi-
cal jurisprudence and legal realism equal weight in the title of his Chapter VII, explicitly recognizes,
"The realist movement in American jurisprudence may be characterized as a radical wing of the
sociological school of law." E. BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 111, 124 (rev. ed. 1974). This gen-
eration also included Ervin H. Pollack, whose posthumously published text treats Sociological Juris-
prudence and Pound in a chapter equal to the one devoted to American Legal Realism. E.
POLLACK, JURISPRUDENCE: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS 635-910 (1979).
Probably the strongest modem defense of Pound's centrality to modem jurisprudence and his
influence on legal realism in recent years is by Wilfrid Rumble. Rumble admits, "Once it is realized
that... sociological jurisprudence had been formulated in the first dozen years of this century, the
debt of the legal realists to Pound becomes clear. To a degree the realist movement was quite obvi-
ously a vigorous reassertion of doctrines the lineage of which leads back to him." W. RUMBLE,
supra note 5, at 13. Nevertheless, Rumble's book is entitled and focuses on American Legal Real-
ism, not Sociological Jurisprudence or Progressive-Pragmatism.
In a recent article, Martin P. Golding discusses Pound's central role in the pragmatic jurispru-
dential reforms of the early twentieth century and his contributions to legal realism, citing a com-
ment by Llewellyn on Pound from a review of Pound's 1959 treatise. He goes on to opine that Pound
"is so much unread today-undeservedly," but seems at a loss to explain why. Golding, Jurispru-
dence and Legal Philosophy in Twentieth-Century America-Major Themes and Developments, 36 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 441, 451 (1986).
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
committed themselves to a cautious progressive reform of courts and
law, pragmatic both in its own methodology and in the way it evaluated
legal rules. Pound drew to himself many younger scholars, including the
future inventor of the Legal Realist movement, Karl Llewellyn. Pound
nurtured these scholars, supported and prodded them. They were Pro-
gressive-Pragmatists who viewed law sociologically and called for its
reform.
In the 1920s, anti-radical witch-hunts outside the courtroom and
conservatism within it forced law professors to choose political sides.
Pound was always on the side of reform, but others felt he moved too
cautiously.II An intellectual rupture with Karl Llewellyn-in large mea-
sure prompted by an unsuccessful attempt at collaboration between the
two' 2-led to the beginnings of the Legal Realist movement and a re-
markable intellectual coup. Llewellyn split the Progressive-Pragmatists
he co-opted some as Legal Realists, despite their disclaimers, and con-
demned the rest to the inferno of legal formalism. There were really two
movements that laid the foundation for modern legal thought, but the
reputation and legacy of one was deliberately smothered in its bed by the
other.
The contextualist enterprise applied to the origin of Legal Realism
reveals that Karl Llewellyn deliberately rewrote the public version of the
intellectual history of the movement to conceal Pound's vital role in it, 13
even though he later conceded a significant role for Pound. 14 Llewellyn's
revision of the intellectual origins of legal realism in a momentary pique
created significant repercussions that affected the course of all later juris-
prudential scholarship. This Article offers a historical reconstruction of
those intellectual origins, which should serve as a stiff antidote to acon-
textual Jurisprudence. It is time to rethink and reconstruct the history of
the formative period of American legal thought.
I. RoscoE POUND
Roscoe Pound for over thirty years held a chaired professorship and
for twenty years served as dean of Harvard Law School. 15 One of the
11. See infra text accompanying notes 66-73.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 116-151.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 75-76.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 152-53.
15. For biographical information on Pound, see P. SAYRE, THE LIVE OF ROscOE POUND
(1948); D. WIGDOR, RoscoE POUND, PHILOSOPHER OF LAW (1974); and a series of articles by A.
Lawrence MacKenzie in Boston Sunday Post, Mar. 14, 1926, at Bl1, col. 1, and Mar. 21, 1926, at
C6, col. 1, respectively (copies in Pound scrapbook, Red Set, Harvard Law School Library)
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most prolific legal scholars of the century, 16 he was also one of the most
colorful figures ever to profess anything at an American university.
Early in his career, while dean of the law department of the University of
Nebraska, he startled the legal profession with his scathing critique of the
legal system. This attack came in 1906, the heyday of political Progres-
sivism. 17 Arguably, no one in the United States at that time was unaware
of child labor, the excesses of the modem corporation, corruption in gov-
ernment (including the courts), political graft, and labor unrest. A pow-
erful, though disorganized, national movement of reformers was hard at
work to remedy society's ills.
While unrest and reform played themselves out in the arena of poli-
tics, a large proportion of the elite bar who attended the annual summer
outing called the American Bar Association convention tried hard to ig-
nore the turmoil. They clung to the belief that they could hold the line
against the ferment, or at least that noisy reform could be kept from
interfering with their comfortable legal club. Into this largely smug con-
clave of business lawyers and conservative judges came the thirty-seven-
year-old Roscoe Pound, who stood ready to push the switch to electrify
the gas-lit mentality of the ABA lawyers.
Pound's talk, "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Ad-
ministration of Justice," '18 laid the woes of the law at the door of over-
eager and legally naive legislators and, most heretically, the judges. He
criticized the bar and bench for allowing treatable symptoms to go un-
corrected. Implicit in Pound's exegesis was a "sociological" approach
that he would later expound in several law review articles over the next
decade. Pound emphasized, in this first talk, the cultural origins of law
and its unresponsiveness to that bugaboo of the lawyers, public opinion.
He was not arguing for direct democratic influence in judicial proce-
dure-for instance, he opposed the interference of politics through the
popular election of judges.19 Rather, Pound argued for judicial decision-
making sensitive to currents of public opinion. 20
Pound's theory of law flew in the face of the prevailing jurispru-
dence of how judges wrote their opinions and decided cases. In the late
nineteenth century, legal orthodoxy claimed that judges objectively dis-
covered principles of law as if they existed independent of concrete cases
16. See F. SETARO, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WRITINGS OF ROSCOE POUND (1942); G.
STRAIT, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WRITINGS OF ROSCOE POUND, 1940-1960 (1960).
17. R. MCCORMICK, THE PARTY PERIOD AND PUBLIC POLICY (1986); G. MOWRY, THE PRO-
GRESSIVE ERA, 1900-20: THE REFORM PERSUASION 13, 35 (3d ed. 1972).
18. 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906).
19. Id. at 400.
20. Id.
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and floated in the ether as TRUTH.21 Fundamental principles never
changed; rules of law, however, might be adapted to fit new facts, but
only by a judge who reverts first to principles and then deduces congru-
ent rules to handle unique cases. A wise judge always could find the
RIGHT answer or outcome for every case. Pound's sociological view
emphasized principles over rules and argued, as a Progressive would,
that rules and principles should be adapted to social, economic, and
political changes. Pound rejected the orthodoxy that principles could ex-
ist in an abstract dimension divorced from social interests. In this lecture
to the ABA convention, Pound first articulated what many of his genera-
tion had begun to recognize, and his bold assault on the established view
inspired like-minded Progressive-Pragmatists to engage in open jurispru-
dential rebellion.
A furor erupted at the ABA meeting over a resolution to have
Pound's talk reprinted and distributed in advance of its publication in the
ABA Annual Report.22 Pound's admirers wanted his scathing critique
disseminated as quickly as possible to all members of the bench and bar
who had not had the opportunity to hear it for themselves. The ABA's
conservative old guard responded by condemning Pound's "drastic at-
tack" and defending the orderly, formalistic system of justice that had
prevailed for nearly half a century. The Progressives retreated in the face
of the "repressed indignation of the assemblage," but the altercation sig-
naled a new generation's open break with the old formalist jurisprudence.
Pound had two great talents as a jurisprudent. First, he was an in-
sightful reader and synthesizer of others's work; often he seemed to ap-
preciate what scholars had said better than they did themselves. His
second talent was his ability to identify the importance of intellectual
trends, both legal and extra-legal, and incorporate them into his view of
law. His soundest works of Jurisprudence reflect these two talents. His
greatest weakness as a jurisprudent was probably his tendency to obfus-
cate his views with pedantry. He was so enamored of comparative juris-
prudence and had such a fecund talent for recall that it is often
impossible today (and, I suspect, was always impossible) to determine
where Pound left his sources and spoke for himself.
21. For an excellent dissection of formalist jurisprudence, see Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy 45
U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1983).
22. The account of what happened at the meeting is taken from Wigmore, Roscoe Pound's St.
Paul Address of 1906: The Spark that Kindled the White Flame of Progress, 20 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y
176 (1937). See also Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the Ameri-
can Law Institute, 8 LAW & HisT. REV. (forthcoming 1990) for an analysis of what happened in St.
Paul and after among the insurgent law professors.
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The article that best displays Pound's strengths and is least marred
by his weaknesses was "Mechanical Jurisprudence. ' 23 In it he explicitly
attacked Formalism. Published in 1908, two years before Pound went to
Harvard, the piece clearly articulated his Progressive-Pragmatic view of
law and explicitly contrasted it with the formalism, or as he called it, the
"jurisprudence of conceptions," of the late nineteenth century. He iden-
tified his sociological approach with philosophical pragmatism: "The so-
ciological movement in jurisprudence is a movement for pragmatism as a
philosophy of law .... "24 He then connected this pragmatic "jurispru-
dence of ends" with the ideals of Progressivism. The goals of his ap-
proach were "the adjustment of principles and doctrines to the human
conditions they are to govern rather than to assume first principles; for
putting the human factor in the central place and relegating logic to its
true position as an instrument." 25 As an example of how his Jurispru-
dence would revise the jurisprudence of everyday law, Pound turned to
modern commercial law. Citing Rudolph von Thering, a Prussian Ro-
manist who wrote incessantly of reconciling interests, 26 Pound argued
that "if a rule of commercial law were in question, the search should be
for the rule that best accords with and gives effect to sound business
practice."'27 Pound himself criticized the American law of partnership
for "deducing its rules from a conception of joint ownership and joint
obligation, instead of ascertaining and giving effect to the actual situation
as understood and practiced by merchants." 28
He expanded on his own approach three years after "Mechanical
Jurisprudence" with a series of articles on what he then termed "Socio-
logical Jurisprudence. ' 29 Pound actually had misgivings about calling
his approach "Sociological Jurisprudence." In 1919, he told Thomas
Reed Powell, whom he would shortly recruit as a colleague at Harvard
Law School,
Very likely the word 'sociological' is unfortunate. Certainly it is unfor-
tunate philologically. On the other hand, I should think it a mistake to
abandon it. The very fact that it is a challenge is of importance... the
radical contrast between the methods that must obtain in the present
and the future and those which obtained in the nineteenth century.
23. 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).
24. Id. at 609.
25. Id. at 609-10.
26. See R. VON JHERING, THE STRUGGLE FOR LAW (1879) (A. Kocourek ed., J. Lalor trans.
1915).
27. Pound, supra note 23, at 610.
28. Id. at 611.
29. Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, (pts. 1-3) 24 HARv. L. REV.
591 (1911); 25 HARv. L. REV. 140, 490 (1912).
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The word 'sociological' seems to me important because it necessarily
associates itself in men's minds with this element of change. 30
At that time, sociology held a position as the most progressive and inno-
vative of the emerging social sciences.31 What alternative to "sociologi-
cal" was there? Pound had one in mind-"realism." Pound was, in that
letter, inviting Powell to give a talk to Phillips Brooks House (Powell was
in practice in New York and had not yet joined the faculty at Harvard
Law School). Pound suggested to Powell that "If your talk took the line
of realism in constitutional law it might do good in an institution where
'the interpretation of a written instrument' has been much insisted
upon."' 32 As it happened, Pound did not take the advice he gave Powell.
In his three-part series of articles on "The Scope and Purpose of
Sociological Jurisprudence, '33 Pound discoursed widely and learnedly on
recent European Jurisprudence. As was Pound's wont, the articles ended
where another scholar would have begun, with his own vision of contex-
tualist legal theory. "Comparing sociological jurists with jurists of other
schools," Pound listed five characteristics of his approach:
1. They look more to the working of the law than to its abstract con-
tent: [a pragmatic characteristic]; 2. They regard law as a social insti-
tution which may be improved by intelligent human effort, and hold it
their duty to discover the best means of furthering and directing such
effort: [part of the Progressive agenda]; 3. They lay stress upon the
social purposes which law subserves rather than upon sanction: [an-
other part of the Progressive agenda]; 4. They urge that legal precepts
are to be regarded more as guides to results which are socially just and
less as inflexible molds: [a second pragmatic characteristic]; 5. Their
philosophical views are very diverse ....
Pound concluded that "unhappily discussion of general principles goes
on and a pragmatist philosophy of law is yet to come. When it is
30. Letter from Pound to Thomas Reed Powell (Mar. 15, 1919) (Pound Papers, 78-6).
31. This was the "pioneering" era of American sociology. A. W. Small founded the first de-
partment of sociology at the University of Chicago in 1895 and within ten years went on to found the
American Sociological Society and the American Journal of Sociology. J. Abraham, "Twentieth-
century Sociology: The Pioneers of the American School," in ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF SOCIO-
LOGICAL THEORY: READINGS ON THE HISTORY OF SOCIOLOGY 131, 134-35 (A. Donini & J.
Novack eds. 1982). Abraham also notes that "The beginnings of American sociology, not surpris-
ingly, coincided with that movement in American philosophy known as pragmatism." Id. at 139.
He concludes that "early American sociology was imbued with a warm, benevolent, if hazy, kind of
idealism. It felt itself involved in the welfare of society, confident in its unbounded optimism that
sooner or later the problems of society would be solved. It was part of the business of sociology, it
was thought, to prescribe remedies." Id. at 139.40. It is not surprising that with its mixture of
Pragmatism and Progressive ideals Roscoe Pound should have sought to ally his view of law with
this burgeoning social scientific discipline. See also, P. BucK, SOCIAL SCIENCES AT HARVARD,
1860-1920, at 8-9 (1965).
32. Letter from Pound to Thomas Reed Powell (Mar. 15, 1919) (Pound Papers, 78-6).
33. See supra note 29.
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promulgated' it may expect many adherents from the sociological
jurists." 34
It was the Pound of "Discontents," "Mechanical Jurisprudence,"
and "Sociological Jurisprudence" that caught the attention of a bright
young associate professor of law at Columbia University, Karl Llewellyn.
Llewellyn subsequently adopted Pound as his mentor in jurisprudence.35
II. KARL LLEWELLYN
In the 1920s, Karl Llewellyn was less well-known than Roscoe
Pound among legal scholars. 36 After World War I, Llewellyn turned
down a permanent teaching position at Yale so that he could practice
commercial law with the illustrious Wall Street firm of Shearman & Ster-
ling, where he spent most of his time representing the National City
Bank. He was convinced that "the law in the books, at least in the com-
mercial field, was 20 years or so behind the actual work in practice, and I
hooked up with the legal work of the National City Bank in the hope of
finding out what the law I had been teaching was all about."' 37 After
three years of practice, Llewellyn returned to Yale as an assistant profes-
sor of commercial law. In 1924, he moved to Columbia because his first
wife was a graduate student there.38
Llewellyn's first major publication, not surprisingly, appeared not in
a law review but in the American Economic Review. 39 In it, Llewellyn
advocated reform of commercial law, arguing that the abstract legal prin-
ciples that dominated late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century com-
mercial codes and court decisions hindered modem business. 4°
Llewellyn wanted commercial law to use the insights of economics and
modem business practices as guides.41 The arguments in his first article
are reminiscent of Pound's comments in 1908. Indeed, Llewellyn pub-
licly acknowledged in this article his admiration for Pound and his debt
to Pound's Jurisprudence. In the very first footnote, Llewellyn admitted:
"The present paper makes little claim to originality in its details. Much
34. Pound, supra note 29, at 516.,
35. See infra text accompanying notes 42-48.
36. For biographical information on Llewellyn see W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE
REALIST MOVEMENT 87-128 (1973).
37. This quotation comes from an autobiographical sketch that Llewellyn apparently prepared
for the Yale Law School alumni, probably for the tenth anniversary of their graduation in 1928.
Llewellyn Papers, biographical data, red box.
38. W. TWINING supra note 36, at 102.
39. Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions Upon Economics, 15 AM. ECON. REV. 665
(1925).
40. Id. at 665.
41. Id. at 672.
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of the synthesis too, has been indicated by various writers from time to
time." He confessed he was "particularly conscious of indebtedness to
Sumner, Holmes, Veblen, Commons and Pound." 42
In 1925, the same year in which his American Economic Review arti-
cle was published, Karl Llewellyn, now thirty-two years old and an asso-
ciate professor at Columbia University School of Law, decided to
articulate his general ideas about the new jurisprudence. Like many am-
bitious younger faculty, he prepared a book proposal for a publisher in
the hope of obtaining an advance contract. The book, at least as Llewel-
lyn described it, was neither completed nor published. All that remains
is a typesqript in the Karl Llewellyn Papers of an outline of chapters and
a thirty-three page introductory essay.43 That never-published introduc-
tory essay is the first expression we have of what Llewellyn meant by the
term "Realistic Jurisprudence" and what he thought were its intellectual
origins. Most interesting, in the light of subsequent events, was the role
he first assigned Roscoe Pound in that movement.
In 1925, Llewellyn unequivocally stated that "[t]he significant
school of jurisprudence today is the sociological, of which Dean Pound
has been the acknowledged leader and spokesman."'44 He admiringly
proclaimed that "the sociological [school] alone is vital, growing, ex-
panding to meet new needs."' 45 The new thinking, a "multiform mass of
efforts," came out of the sociological school.46 In analyzing this "new
thinking," the only two tenets Llewellyn identified to which nearly every
writer in this movement could agree-"that jurisprudence cannot stand
alone; and that the significant aspect of law is law's effect" 47-appeared
in Pound's Jurisprudential agenda from the very beginning. Throughout
his "introduction," Llewellyn admitted that most of the breakthroughs
and ideas could be traced to Pound. Indeed, Llewellyn called Pound's
chapter in the recently published book, The History and Prospects of the
Social Sciences, the "best starting place" in the process of describing the
new jurisprudential movement. 48
42. Id. at 665 n.l.
43. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence, Llewellyn Papers, B.I.6.a.-c [hereinafter Llewellyn
manuscript].
44. Id. at 1.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 2.
48. Id. The book was a collection of essays by various authors on all areas of the social sciences
published in the same year that Llewellyn wrote his unpublished essay on Realistic Jurisprudence.
Pound, Jurisprudence, in THE HISTORY AND PROSPECTS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 444 (H. Barnes,
ed. 1925).
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It is interesting that Llewellyn singled out this obscure essay by
Pound as his "starting place" for explaining Realistic Jurisprudence.
Neither Llewellyn nor any subsequent scholar of Pound or Legal Real-
ism that I could find thereafter ever cited the piece.49 Despite the later
obscurity of the collection and Pound's essay in it, in 1925, committed as
he was to a social scientific approach to law, Llewellyn's attention was
naturally drawn to the newly published book.
Pound's chapter on "Jurisprudence" was, to some extent, a re-
worked summary of his three-part Harvard Law Review article on Socio-
logical Jurisprudence, but Pound strengthened the programmatic impact
of his own ideas in the later piece by simplifying the intellectual back-
ground and stating his own agenda more forcefully. In writing about the
"Sociological School" of Jurisprudence, Pound argued that sociological
jurisprudents, including himself of course, shared a common perspective
on the law. He claimed that they
look to the working of the law rather than to its abstract content; they
regard law as a social institution involving both finding by experience
and conscious making-an institution which may be improved by con-
scious human effort; they lay stress upon the social ends which law
subserves rather than upon sanctions; they look on legal precepts and
doctrines and institutions functionally and regard the form of legal
precepts as a means only. Philosophically they are chiefly positivists or
neo-realists. They employ a pragmatist method which is consistent
with different metaphysical starting points. 50
That Llewellyn found his views resonating so closely with Pound's is not
surprising. All of the characteristics of the sociological jurisprudents
that Pound identified in his chapter were characteristics associated with
what Llewellyn defined as Realistic Jurisprudence.
In his unpublished essay, Llewellyn quoted the seven points that
Pound had claimed to be the "program" of the sociological jurists.
1. Study of the actual social effects of legal institutions and legal doc-
trines ....
2. Sociological study in preparation for lawmaking.
3. Study of the means of making precepts effective in action.
49. The literature on Pound's jurisprudence is nearly as extensive as the opus of the man him-
self, but a survey of some of the major studies of Pound, including Grossman, The Legal Philosophy
of Roscoe Pound, 44 YALE L.J. 605 (1935); Kreilkamp, Dean Pound and the End of Law, 9 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 196 (1940); Morris, Dean Pound's Jurisprudence, in R. SUMMERS, MORE ESSAYS IN
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1971); D. WIGDOR, RoscoE POUND, PHILOSOPHER OF LAW (1974) shows
that they do not cite Pound's 1925 chapter in the Barnes collection. Curiously, Wigdor cites Walter
Shepard's chapter in the same volume but never refers to Pound's own essay. Id. at 334 n.29. Wil-
frid Rumble's book, supra note 5, at 9-13, connects Pound's sociological jurisprudence to Legal
Realism, but his argument would have been even more forceful had he explored Pound's chapter in
History and Prospects of the Social Sciences.
50. Pound, supra note 48, at 458 (emphasis added).
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4. Study of juridical method.
5. A sociological legal history; study of the social background and
social effects of legal precepts, legal doctrines, and legal institutions in
the past, and of how these effects have been brought about.
6. Recognition of the importance of individualized application of
legal precepts.
7. In English-speaking countries [sic], a ministry of justice. 51
These seven points were similar, but not identical, to the characteristics
Pound had earlier described in "Sociological Jurisprudence. ' 52 Llewel-
lyn conceded: "The first, third, fourth and fifth of these points may well
be found to cover the bulk of the present paper .... -53 In fine, Llewel-
lyn's view of Realistic Jurisprudence almost totally coincided with
Pound's description of Sociological Jurisprudence, though Llewellyn ar-
gued that the "differences in emphasis become significant enough to war-
rant continuing."' 54 The primary difference in emphasis, Llewellyn
contended through the next several pages, was Pound's integration (or
confusion) of ethics, morality, or prescriptive ideals with juristic science.
Llewellyn noted that "[i]t is hard to see how a movement for anything
but discovery of objectively verifiable facts and relations between facts
can be characteristic of any science."'55 To the extent that Pound and
others had characterized Jurisprudence as a science, therefore, Llewellyn
retorted that it was an error to study what "is" and what "ought" to be
as one enterprise.5 6
Llewellyn had already criticized Pound's unscientific analysis of the
relationship of Law and Morals in a Yale Law Journal review of Pound's
published McNair Lectures.57 Llewellyn took Pound to task: "what the
author means by morals, and the genesis and working of such morals as
agencies of social control, are passed over in silence."58 Llewellyn's frus-
tration with Pound's analysis was not unjustfied. After a detailed histori-
cal treatment of various Jurisprudents' views, Pound had concluded:
In general law cannot depart far from ethical custom nor lag far be-
hind it. For law does not enforce itself. Its machinery must be set in
motion and kept in motion and guided in its motion by individual
human beings; and there must be something more than the abstract
51. Id. Llewellyn quoted the list of points directly from Pound's chapter, supra note 48 at 462-
63.
52. See supra text accompanying note 34.
53. Llewellyn Manuscript, supra note 43, at 2.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 3.
56. Id. at 3-4.
57. Llewellyn, Book Review, 34 YALE L.J. 113 (1924) (reviewing R. POUND, LAW AND
MORALS (1924)).
58. Id. at 113. John Dewey similarly criticized Pound in his review of Law and Morals.
Dewey, Book Review, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 245, 246 (1925).
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content of the legal precept to move these human beings to act and to
direct their action.59
In the very next sentences, however, Pound retreated from this "realis-
tic" evaluation. Pound stated:
Yet one need but look at a mass of legal precepts that make up the
bulk of legal systems today in order to see that they are anything but
authoritative promulgations of ethical custom. For the most part they
represent juristic or judicial search for a rule that will follow logically
from the traditional legal materials, or for a rule that may be said to
have authority behind it. They are technical workings over of the
traditional precepts, or technical adaptations of authoritative extra-
legal propositions. They are the technical, scientific custom of the
courts and lawyers.60
It is not hard to see how Pound's contradictory statements about law as
ethical imperative and law as juristic technique might have led Llewellyn
to conclude that "the interest and value of the lectures do not lie in the
light they shed upon their titular subject."'61
Despite Llewellyn's reservations about Pound's views on the rela-
tionship of juristic science and morals, Llewellyn, in his "Realistic Juris-
prudence" manuscript, confessed that
[d]espite these difficulties, the road again seems open. The sociological
school, in shifting emphasis from rule and precept to the effect of law,
have taken us out of a study of words into a study of deeds, have
shifted our focus from the point where "ought" intrudes most insidi-
ously to the point where "is" stands observable by any who will look.
Under this new emphasis the correspondence of observed data to real-
ity acquires some pragmatic guaranty. 62
The conclusion reached by Llewellyn echoes that reached by Pound in
"Sociological Jurisprudence" and his chapter in The History and Pros-
pects of the Social Sciences in its call for a pragmatic jurisprudential ap-
proach. Thus, although Llewellyn would temporarily divorce the
Pragmatic from the Progressive, he acknowledged his Realistic approach
was but a plantlike "shoot" off the "vital" "stock" of Pound's Sociologi-
cal Jurisprudence. 63
59. R. POUND, LAW AND MORALS 122 (1924).
60. Id. at 122-23.
61. Llewellyn, supra note 57, at 113.
62. Llewellyn Manuscript, supra note 43, at 5-6.
63. Id. at 1.
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III. LLEWELLYN'S EXCLUSION OF POUND
Let's jump forward in time, just a bit. Elsewhere I have described in
some detail the famous 1930-1931 "debate" between Karl Llewellyn and
Roscoe Pound.64 I will only briefly outline that debate here.
Near the end of 1930, Llewellyn finally went into print with his ju-
risprudential ideas in a Columbia Law Review article entitled, "A Realis-
tic Jurisprudence-The Next Step." 65 Although he acknowledged the
leadership of Pound in modem Jurisprudence generally, he was neverthe-
less both highly critical of Pound's views and downplayed, without ex-
plicitly denying, any direct link between the "Realistic" Jurisprudence
that he promoted, and the sociological school of Jurisprudence advo-
cated by Pound. In March, 1931, Pound responded, to Llewellyn's arti-
cle and Jerome Frank's Law and the Modern Mind, 66 in a Harvard Law
Review article entitled "The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence. ' 67 Pound
commended the Realist movement in a general way. Indeed, Pound was
essentially the first person to acknowledge that there was an actual
"movement" in place. At the same time, he identified serious flaws and
fallacies in some of the Realist authors' scholarly work, although he
failed to cite a single specific book, article, or author to support his
criticism.
Llewellyn responded almost viscerally to Pound's article. With the
aid of Jerome Frank68 he wrote a second article entitled "Some Realism
About Realism-A Reply to Dean Pound," which was published in the
Harvard Law Review only three months after Pound's essay. 69 In this
latter piece-now considered a classic of jurisprudential literature and
the definitive statement about the early Realist movement-Llewellyn
identified twenty-two Realists whose work he vould survey in order to
refute Pound's critique.70 In doing this, Llewellyn effectively defined the
boundaries of the new legal thought and categorized all modem legal
64. Hull, supra note 3.
65. Llewellyn, Next Step, supra note 3.
66. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
67. Pound, supra note 3.
68. The Llewellyn-Frank alliance was predictably short-lived; their falling out in the early
1940s was inevitable. Jerome Frank's "Realism" was distinctly different from Llewellyn's. Indeed,
while I argue that Llewellyn was a genuine Realist, Frank, with his view of the extreme subjectivity
of legal facts, his "fact-skepticism," was what we would now call an "Anti-Realist." Compare Frank
with the post-structuralists, supra note 7. Thus I will argue in my book that although Llewellyn
remained fond of and continued to admire Frank's emphasis on trial courts, he finally recognized
how much closer he was to Pound than Frank in the Jurisprudential universe. N. HULL, POUND
AND LLEWELLYN: CONSENSUS AND CONFLICT IN THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN JURISPRU-
DENCE, 1902-1962 (forthcoming).
69. Llewellyn, Reply, supra note 3.
70. Id. at 1257-59.
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theorists as either belonging to the movement or opposing it: one was
either part of the modem trend in jurisprudence or one of the old-style
thinkers.
In compiling his list of the "ins," Llewellyn consulted many of the
theorists he admired on the question of who ought to be considered a
"realist. ' 71 At least two of his correspondents logically enough sug-
gested that he include Pound himself. They recognized the role Pound
had played in the development and practice of the new thought and pro-
posed that including Pound would deflate his critique. 72 One of these
men advised Llewellyn, correctly I think, that Pound wanted to be iden-
tified with the new legal thought, and if Pound was peeved at all with
some of the recent literature, it was because he had been isolated from
rather than acknowledged as part of the newer movement.73
Llewellyn responded negatively to these suggestions to include
Pound. He repeatedly refused to add Pound to his list, ostensibly be-
cause Pound had written too much to survey in the short time Llewellyn
had to get out the response--or at least that is what he told his col-
leagues. 74 In fact, Llewellyn's objections ran deeper. In a draft footnote
that was not included in the published article-again extant only as a
typescript in Llewellyn's papers-Llewellyn outlined the intellectual his-
tory of the "newer legal thinking," an intellectual history that explicitly
denied any connection or debt to Pound and his sociological jurispru-
dence.75 Llewellyn emphatically argued: "None [of the new legal think-
ers] draws in any important measure on Pound. Rather, already set in
their views, did they go back over Pound's work critically, accepting
here, rejecting there, in the light of their own thinking. '76
During the six years between Llewellyn's acknowledgment of
Pound's inspiration of the Realist movement and the Harvard Law Re-
view debate, Llewellyn completely reconceptualized the intellectual pedi-
gree of "Realistic Jurisprudence," banishing Pound from the central
place in its development and sending him into exile from jurisprudential
reform. Why? What had happened in the intervening years to so alien-
ate Llewellyn from Pound's Jurisprudence? Why did Llewellyn feel he
had to divorce himself and his movement from the eminent Harvard
71. Memorandum sent to several addressees (Mar. 27, 1931) (Llewellyn Papers, B.65(b)).
72. Letter from Charles E. Clark to Llewellyn (Mar. 31, 1931); Letter from Joseph Walter
Bingham to Llewellyn (Apr. 7, 1931), (Llewellyn Papers, A.II.65(b)).
73. Letter from Joseph Walker Bingham to Llewellyn, (Aug. 10, 1931) (Llewellyn Papers,
A.II.65(b)).
74. Letters from Llewellyn to Joseph Walker Bingham (Apr. 13, 1931 and Aug. 31, 1931)
(Liewellyn Papers, A.II.65(b)).
75. Proposed Footnote to Article in Reply to Pound, in Llewellyn Papers, A.II.6.(b).
76. Id. at 3.
1317Vol. 1989:1302]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
dean who had earlier played such an important role in Llewellyn's ideas
about jurisprudential reform?
IV. CAUSES OF THE ESTRANGEMENT
Two incidents during those crucial years help explain Llewellyn's
increasing estrangement from Pound's Jurisprudence: Llewellyn's and
Pound's respective roles in the Sacco and Vanzetti appeals in 1927, and
the further intellectual and personal schism between Llewellyn and
Pound over an article about contract law they were supposed to write
together for the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Though the one was
a celebrated criminal case and the other an obscure event, they reinforced
in Llewellyn's mind Pound's politic caution-a trait Llewellyn neither
shared nor understood. Moreover, events during their collaboration
caused a personal breach between the two men that had direct jurispru-
dential repercussions.
A. The Sacco and Vanzetti Affair
In 1925, just as Llewellyn penned his book prospectus and published
in American Economic Review his article lauding Pound's Sociological
Jurisprudence, Roscoe Pound quietly involved himself in the national fu-
ror over the conviction and condemnation in Massachusetts of Nicola
Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti. The cobbler and the fish monger were
leaders in a 'post-war anarchist workers movement. Both men were ac-
cused and convicted of a payroll robbery and murder of a guard. The
case had drawn widespread attention because substantial questions had
been raised about the fairness of the proceedings: were the two radical
immigrants found guilty of the crime charged, or had they been prose-
cuted and condemned for who they were and what they represented?
The resulting furor among thoughtful citizens and intellectual leaders
grew to such a pitch in the mid-1920s that few in public life or academia
could remain neutral in the debate. Like the Dreyfus affair less than a
half-century before in France and the McCarthy hearings a half-century
later in the United States, the Sacco and Vanzetti case became a passion-
ate cause cdkibre for educated Americans. If a miscarriage of justice was
being perpetrated in Massachusetts, then the American system of justice
stood trial. That law professors would be drawn into the debate should
surprise no one. Who else could better evaluate the judicial proceedings
1318 [Vol. 1989:1302
LLEWELLYN-POUND EXCHANGE
and advise the public on their legality? Who had greater expertise or
interest in the fundamental structure of American justice?77
Conventional accounts of the Sacco and Vanzetti case tell us that
Harvard law professor Felix Frankfurter was the first legal academic to
involve himself as adviser to defendants' counsel. 78 In fact, Frankfurter
was not the first Harvard academic to write to William Thompson, Sacco
and Vanzetti counsel in their appeals, or to critically comment on the
legal proceedings. On May 9, 1925, nearly two years before Frank-
furter's published defense of Sacco and Vanzetti in the Atlantic
Monthly, 79 Roscoe Pound contacted Thompson to suggest a line of at-
tack on the identification evidence presented at the anarchists' trial.80 A
month and a half later, the Harvard dean wrote again to Thompson with
a more forceful expression of his opinion of the case: "At the time of the
... trial I read the testimony from day to day in the newspapers, and had
a very strong feeling that I would not hang a dog on the evidence." 81 He
also told Thompson that he was "convinced that the whole trial ought to
be written up thoroughly," but he personally demurred from the job
since "just at the moment it would be quite impossible for me to do so."
He regretted that his hectic schedule kept him from taking on the task
because, he told Thompson, "I feel strongly that somebody ought to have
the courage and the sense of justice to speak out vigorously about these
cases."
' 82
As strongly as he may have felt about the injustice, Pound did not
want to speak out. He recounted to Thompson the problems that had
plagued his colleague Zechariah Chafee, Jr., when Chafee publicly criti-
cized the Abrams free speech case during the red persecutions of 1920.83
Chafee nearly lost his position when conservative Harvard alumni scored
the law professor's support of the radical New Yorkers. Pound himself
may have felt some heat since Chafee had convinced the dean to sign the
Abrams petition as well. Pound had stood by Chafee, defending him and
saving his job. In comparison to the Chafee Abrams episode, local feel-
ing on the Sacco and Vanzetti cases was so much more charged that
77. The two best books about the case are L. JOUGHIN & E. MORGAN, THE LEGACY OF SACCO
AND VANZETTI (1948) and W. YOUNG & D. KAISER, POSTMORTEM: NEW EVIDENCE IN THE
CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI (1985).
78. W. YOUNG & D. KAISER, supra note 77, at 5-6.
79. Frankfurter, Case of Sacco and Vanzetti, 1927 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 409.
80. Letter from Pound to Thompson (May 9, 1925) (Pound Papers, 33-44).
81. Letter from Pound to Thompson (June 28, 1925) (Pound Papers, 33-24).
82. Id.
83. On Chafee's role in theAbrams case, see R. POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE Abrams
Case, The Supreme Court, and Free Speech 272-84 (1987); D. SMITH, ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR.:
DEFENDER OF LIBERTY AND LAW 36-57 (1986).
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Pound certainly would have jeopardized his deanship if he had gone pub-
lic with his condemnation of the proceedings.
In the spring of 1927, after Judge Webster Thayer sentenced the
men to death, supporters of Sacco and Vanzetti stepped up their public
appeals and their attacks on the fairness of the proceedings. Pound never
did find the time to challenge the injustice of the trial, but the law school
community was directly drawn into the furor when Felix Frankfurter's
strongly-worded assault on the legal proceedings appeared in the March
issue of the venerable, Boston-based Atlantic Monthly. The conservative
supporters of the verdict found their champion in the same criminal law
and evidence expert who had supported the conviction of the Abrams
defendants: former Northwestern University Law School dean, John
Henry Wigmore. 84 Wigmore's intemperate article attacking Frankfurter
and praising Judge Thayer and the legal system of Massachusetts en-
raged liberal legal academics. 85 Even his old friend and protege Roscoe
Pound was incensed by Wigmore's attack on Frankfurter. Privately,
Pound wrote to a law school alumnus that "Wigmore ought to be shown
up in this matter... [his Boston Evening Transcript] letters are a disgrace
to legal scholarship. '8 6 Yet again Pound would not publicly take up
Frankfurter's defense. Pound confided that he "had thought seriously
(when the smoke of controversy had cleared away a bit, and reason on
this subject had ceased to be inhibited) of writing the matter up myself
... [but] I do not see any reason why, after the careful, scientific review
of the matter which I know you would make, you should not speak out
in meeting your conclusions. ' 87 But Pound himself would not speak out
or publicly take a stance in defense of Sacco and Vanzetti or meet head
on Wigmore's attack on Pound's own colleague.
Contrary to accounts by Pound's biographers, however, 88 Pound
did enter the public debate about the Sacco and Vanzetti case. He wrote
84. On Wigmore's attack on Holmes's dissent (Brandeis concurring) in Abrams, see R.
POLENBERG, supra note 83, at 248-56.
85. Wigmore, J.H. Wigmore Answers Frankfurter Attack on Sacco-Vanzetti Verdict, Boston
Evening Transcript, Apr. 25, 1927, at 1, 12, col. 5 (available in Wigmore Papers, Northwestern
University Library). Frankfurter replied to Wigmore the next day in the same newspaper and then
Wigmore responded in a second article in the Boston Evening Transcript. Wigmore, Wigmore Re-
plies to Frankfurter in Sacco- Vanzetti Controversy, Boston Evening Transcript, May 10, 1927, at 14,
col. 3 (available in Wigmore Papers, labeled as B Herald).
86. Letter from Pound to Eustace Seligman (May 23, 1927) (Pound Papers, 32-14).
87. Id.
88. Neither of Pound's biographers appear to be aware of Pound's advice and correspondence
with the defendant's counsel on appeal, William Thompson, the Pound petition calling for an in-
dependent panel to review clemency for Sacco and Vanzetti or his letter to the editor about the
pardon process. The letter is quoted in L. JOUGHIN AND E. MORGAN, supra note 77 at 302. Mor-
gan was Pound's colleague at Harvard. While the discussion, infra note 106, agrees that Pound's
public expressions were carefully neutral about the case, nevertheless his public statements could be
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and promoted a petition to Governor Fuller that called for "'a disinter-
ested board.., in whom the people have confidence' to report to the
'Governor their findings of fact, their opinions and their conclusions.' "89
But Pound's petition explicitly stated that it was "not intended as an
expression of our opinion on the question of the guilt or innocence of
Sacco and Vanzetti now under sentence of death, or on the questions of
the fairness of their trial or the justice accorded them." 90 Pound's peti-
tion was meticulously neutral; it displayed not a hint of his true opinion
of the matter. If he had taken a stronger, more partisan stand, such a
public declaration by the preeminent law school dean in the country
might have had an enormous impact on the outcome of the appeal.
Though he felt very strongly about the case, Pound nevertheless re-
frained from using his prestige to aid the two men. He earlier had ex-
cused himself from public comment by arguing that it was improper to
criticize a case while it was still on appeal before the courts; by late April
that was no longer the case. Pound knew that Frankfurter's involvement
had brought the law school into controversy and any partisanship on the
dean's part would have caused serious damage to the school's relation-
ship to the Massachusetts legal community.
Llewellyn, a mere associate professor at Columbia University School
of Law in New York, was either far less vulnerable to assault for public
advocacy of Sacco and Vanzetti, or far more vulnerable, since his promo-
tion to full professor, coincidentally processed that same spring, might
have been jeopardized by his involvement in the hotly debated case.
Llewellyn did not weigh his vulnerability. He charged into the crusade
for the condemned radicals regardless of consequences. Perhaps dissatis-
fied with the inadequacy of Pound's petition, Llewellyn agreed to spear-
head an American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) campaign to organize
the nation's law professors in support of the defendants' appeal. After
Vanzetti applied to Massachusetts Governor Alvin Fuller for clemency
in early May, 1927, Llewellyn organized his own law professors's petition
for Vanzetti on legal grounds.91 Llewellyn and the ACLU probably
hoped that if an overwhelming number of the nation's law professors
publicly expressed their doubt that the trial passed procedural muster,
and probably were construed as supporting the convicted men. Wigdor explicitly denies that Pound
ever engaged in the public debate. D. WIGDOR, supra note 15, at 249-50. Sayre simply never men-
tions any public activity by Pound and by apologizing for Pound he implicitly suggests he stayed out
of the public debate. P. SAYRE, supra note 15, at 219-23.
89. Undated and unattributed newspaper clipping found in Llewellyn Papers, G.II.(S-V)
(Green Box). A brief summary of the petition appears in Says Judge Thayer Did Confuse Issue, N.Y.
Times, April 27, 1927, at 16, col. 6.
90. Id.
91. For Llewellyn's role in the Sacco-Vanzetti affair, see Llewellyn Papers G.II. (Green Box).
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Fuller would have to appoint an independent panel that might recom-
mend clemency and the men would be saved.
Llewellyn's petition barely avoided advocacy, asserting that
only a review by an impartial body can determine whether the widely
held belief is true that two issues had been confused in the murder
trial-the radicalism of the defendants and their guilt or innocence of
the murder .... [T]he fact there is widespread doubt as to the justice
of the result lends color to the possibility that such mistake may have
been committed." 92
In other words, Llewellyn, while ostensibly protecting the neutrality of
the professors on the merits of the case, actually allied them with those
who condemned the proceedings.
With the scheduled execution date only one month away, Llewellyn
telegraphed every legal academic he knew and every major law school in
the country to obtain signatories for his petition.93 Sixty-one law profes-
sors from twelve law schools signed or authorized acquiescence in Llew-
ellyn's petition.94 All but two of Llewellyn's own colleagues joined him.
Interestingly, some of the signatories apparently first made his acquain-
tance through the petition. 95 Indeed, quite a few of the Realists on both
Llewellyn's published and unpublished lists responded favorably to
Llewellyn's appeal and signed the petition,96 although several of them
were not active jurisprudents and the label of Realist was never otherwise
applied to them.97
It seems probable that Llewellyn's view of who were the jurispru-
dentially enlightened was to some extent influenced by their support for
Sacco and Vanzetti. Without specifically mentioning the Sacco and Van-
zetti episode as a criterion for identifying the Realists, Llewellyn much
later confided to a friend that "he doubted there was any significant con-
92. Professors of Law Urge Sacco Inquiry, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1927, at 9, col. 1 [hereinafter
Professors].
93. Copies of Llewellyn's telegram and many of the telegraphed responses are in the Sacco and
Vanzetti material, Llewellyn Papers G.II (Green Box).
94. Professors, supra note 92.
95. See, for example, telegrams from Joseph Francis and Max Radin that indicate that they
were not previously acquainted with Llewellyn, Llewellyn, Papers G.II. (Green Box).
96. Eleven of the twenty-two individuals listed as Realists in Llewellyn, Reply, supra note 3,
signed the petition: Underhill Moore, Herman Oliphant, Edwin Patterson, Hessel Yntema, Joseph
W. Bingham, L.A. Tulin, Walter Wheeler Cook, Ernest Lorenzen, Charles E. Clark, and Joseph F.
Francis (as well as Llewellyn himself). Id. at 1257-59. Four additional law professors whom Llew-
ellyn included on the longer list of Realists that he sent to Pound, but omitted from the published
article, also signed the petition: Young B. Smith, Alexander M. Kidd, Richard R, Powell and Rob-
ert Maynard Hutchins. See Hull, supra note 3, at 969.
97. For example, Young B. Smith, Robert Maynard Hutchins, Richard R. Powell and Alexan-
der M. Kidd. Comparison of petition published in Professors, supra note 92, to list sent to Pound
(published in Hull, supra note 3, at 969).
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nection between the juristic and political views of Realists, except that
some, but by no means all, who wanted reform within the field of law
were also interested in political reform." 98 Despite his own denial that
politics was the intellectual impetus for the so-called Realists, Llewellyn
disingenuously suggested that "Pound's dislike of Realism may have
been politically motivated." 99 Notably absent from those signing or au-
thorizing support for the Llewellyn-ACLU petition were any members of
the Harvard Law School faculty, including Roscoe Pound.
Pound's calculated neutrality in his petition to Governor Fuller may
have been a pragmatic strategy. Perhaps Pound thought that his enor-
mous reputation and professed public neutrality on the merits would lead
Fuller to appoint the Harvard dean himself to this independent panel-
and if so, Pound could do the two condemned men greater service as an
official advisor to the governor than as an outspoken, but officially pow-
erless, public advocate. Pound's description of the qualifications for the
men Fuller should choose supports such an interpretation. Pound rec-
ommended that the "disinterested board... be composed of lawyers and
laymen of standing in whom the people have confidence." 100 There was
probably no lawyer in Massachusetts at that time who had greater stand-
ing with the thoughtful public than Pound, and he had demonstrated his
disinterestedness. Pound, however, was not chosen for the panel.
Governor Fuller, under increasing pressure by law professors and
others, finally appointed an "independent" advisory committee on June
1, 1927. Instead of choosing the law school dean, Governor Fuller ap-
pointed Harvard University President A. Lawrence Lowell to chair the
"independent" panel to review the Sacco and Vanzetti case.101 Lowell,
however, came to the panel predisposed to condemn the two men.
Pound and Lowell had been friends and allies in the Chafee affair;10 2 they
respected one another. Lowell had actually confided to Pound, before
the former had been appointed to chair the commission, "that he did not
care whether they [Sacco and Vanzetti] were guilty or not, public confi-
dence in the institutions of Massachusetts required that the sentence be
carried out."10 3 In a letter to former U.S. Senator and ABA President
Chester Long in which Pound reported Lowell's comments, Pound indi-
98. William Twining paraphrasing letter from Llewellyn to G.B.J. Hughes (August 10, 1954)
(Llewellyn Papers, R. VIII, 17, at 522 n.7).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See L. JOUGHIN AND E. MORGAN, supra note 77, at 298, 301, 302-04.
102. See R. POLENBERG, supra note 83, at 281.
103. Pound did not identify who among the panel had expressed these views, but it is a reason-
able inference that only Lowell had a close enough relationship to Pound to have made such a
confidence. Letter from Pound to Chester I. Long (Aug. 6, 1927) (Pound Papers, 24-9).
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cated that he might go public with this information before the American
Bar Association Executive Committee "should it become necessary to
discuss [the Lowell Commission's] report," although he admitted "I
hope it will not [be necessary] until things have cooled off a bit... ." 04
Despite his own certain knowledge of Lowell's bias, Pound never pub-
licly spoke out against the governor or his commission, even though such
damning testimony might have impeached the Commission's report and
created a public furor that could have saved the two men's lives. Pri-
vately, Pound continued to express his personal reservations about the
case to almost anyone who wrote to him about the affair.10 5 While he
encouraged his correspondents to write to newspapers expressing their
own views, the dean resolutely refused to have his own stand publicly
disseminated. 10 6 His only other public comment was another neutrally-
worded, scholarly letter to the Boston Herald on June, 1927, that dis-
cussed "petitions for pardon and the relation of the exercise of the par-
doning power to the administration of justice by the courts."10 7
Pound's failure to commit himself publicly in defense of Sacco and
Vanzetti contrasted sharply with Llewellyn's own approach. Llewellyn
abandoned even the semblance of academic neutrality after Governor
Fuller's commission affirmed Thayer's death sentence. On the eve of the
two men's execution, Llewellyn delivered an impassioned radio address
condemning Governor Fuller, Judge Thayer, and the Massachusetts ap-
pellate process.10 8 Indeed, Llewellyn's interest in the case did not dimin-
ish even after the execution. He joined the executive committee of the
Sacco and Vanzetti National League, the successor to the Defense Com-
mittee, and began work on a book for the League that would presumably
104. Id.
105. See numerous letters in Pound Papers, 24-9, 34-14.
106. Pound wrote favorably to Richard Washburn Child complimenting him on a manuscript
about the case and expressed his views that
Instead of seeking to maintain a temporary confidence in our criminal justice by upholding
the conviction at all hazards, the profession ought to be concerned with the right and
justice of the cause, reflecting that the ultimate effect on confidence in our criminal courts
will be the more serious should a factitious, temporarily-built-up confidence will fail us.
Letter from Pound to Richard Washburn Child (Jan. 3, 1927) (Pound Papers, 23-18). But when
Child wanted to quote Pound in the published version of the article, the dean hastily wrote Walter
Lippman, editor at the World, that when he wrote to Child he "was not writing for publication."
Letter from Pound to Walter Lippman (Jan. 26, 1927) (Pound Papers, 23-18).
107. Pound's letter appeared in the Boston Herald, June 4, 1927. The description of Pound's
letter comes from a letter of appreciation from Reverend Edward C. Camp, Pastor of the Phillips
Congregational Church in Watertown, Mass. to Pound written on the day Pound's Boston Herald
letter was published. Letter from Edward C. Camp to Pound (June 4, 1927) (Pound Papers, 32-14).
108. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Sacco-Vanzetti Case, (Aug. 20, 1927) (speech delivered at
WPCH, New York City, reprinted in W. TWINING, THE KARL LLEWELLYN PAPERS 105-10 (1968).
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vindicate the dead men. 109 Pound, even after the furor had died down,
only encouraged others to protest the injustice of the case and continued
to remain neutral in public. 110
109. The manuscript for Llewellyn's contribution to the Sacco and Vanzetti book as well as the
correspondence with the Sacco and Vanzetti League, the other contributors and the publisher are all
contained in Llewellyn Papers, G.II. (S-V) (Green Box).
110. See, for instance, Pound's correspondence with Henry Edgerton and Charles Culp Burling-
ham in the fall of 1927 (Pound Papers, 32-14).
Pound alienated his longtime ally Felix Frankfurter and other liberal members of his law
faculty in an in-house postscript to the case. The Fall following the Sacco and Vanzetti executions,
two law school faculty appointments ran afoul of President Lowell. In both cases, the president was
probably using the appointments as surrogates for his anger at his Sacco and Vanzetti nemesis, Felix
Frankfurter. A young Jewish assistant professor of law, Nathan Margold, came up for a vote for a
permanent position. The law faculty, including Pound, voted overwhelmingly to approve the
Margold appointment, but President Lowell vetoed the faculty's recommendation. The faculty sus-
pected Pound "was not as enthusiastic about Margold in his private discussions with Lowell as he
was in front of his colleagues." When Frankfurter, Edmund M. Morgan and T.R. Powell tried to
move to resubmit the appointment, Pound opposed the motion. Pound did not carry the law profes-
sors' banner. He acquiesced in Margold's rejection and frustrated Frankfurter and his allies.
Pound's reasons are understandable if not laudable. Margold was a reasonably strong candidate by
law school standards, but he was, by no means, a rising star of legal scholarship. Lowell may have
unfairly rejected the appointment, but Pound didn't see the merits of Margold's case as strong
enough to jeopardize his deanship. And, of course, to openly challenge the president of the univer-
sity on an faculty appointment decision was doomed to failure. The likely result would then be that
Pound would be forced to resign. If he wavered over taking such a step for Frankfurter, then it was
ridiculous to expect him to take such a suicidal move for Margold. And for Pound, being forced to
give up the deanship would have been a kind of suicide. Being dean of Harvard Law School was the
position for which he had striven throughout his career. Though tempted with important judicial
appointments and actually being offered the presidency of the University of Wisconsin, he turned
them all down to remain dean. Now Frankfurter and the liberal faculty expected him to sacrifice his
deanship for a lowly, and not terribly promising assistant professor-for Pound, it was unthinkable.
Later that year, another dispute erupted with Lowell when the president disregarded the
faculty's unanimous support of Frankfurter's protege, James M. Landis as professor of legislation.
Again, the faculty was unhappy with Pound's advocacy of their position when the dean sought a
compromise with Lowell, rather than fighting Lowell on the matter. Pound's actions in the Margold
and Landis appointments were not popular with Frankfurter and his friends. The independence and
honor of the faculty was at stake. Pound had failed to vigorously support them in the face of a
flagrant and prejudiced attack by the autocratic university president. He had allied himself with
conservative forces, and word spread through the legal academic community: Pound was a trimmer,
indeed, not a reformer, not a member of the liberal, new-thinking vanguard, but a supporter of the
status-quo old guard. And if he was one of them now, perhaps he always had been. All in all,
Pound's role in the Sacco and Vanzetti case and its aftermath helped to isolate him from his Juris-
prudential heirs, because a liberal viewpoint was one index of the reformist Jurisprudence.
See L. KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 58-61 (1986). Kalman recognizes
the fact that Pound's difficulties with Frankfurter stemmed from his "appeasement of President
Lowell in the 1920s," and that Lowell had been Frankfurter's nemesis at least since 1927, as a result
of their contrary positions on the Sacco and Vanzetti case, but she does not directly connect Low-
ell's actions on the Margold and Landis appointments-in the very Fall after the executions-to his
antagonism for Frankfurter. Like Kalman, Wigdor attributes the rift between Pound and his faculty
to the Margold appointment but does not see the connection to the Sacco and Vanzetti case; it is
simply a question of Lowell's anti-semitism. D. WIGDOR, supra note 10, at 251.
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It is important to understand that Pound's position was allied in
spirit to the liberals who supported Sacco and Vanzetti, even if he did not
stand shoulder to shoulder with them in the public arena. He had not yet
associated himself with political conservatives, not in 1927, but the lib-
eral-progressive rabble rouser who had excoriated the ABA in 1906, pub-
licly condemned the U.S. Attorney General for the red persecutions of
1920, and defended Zechariah Chafee and the Abrams defendants in
1921, now shrank from publicly avowing his private convictions. This
case was too close to home, in his own backyard as it were. To openly
broadcast his position would antagonize the Massachusetts bar, law
school alumni, and most importantly, the president of his university at
whose pleasure he served as dean. Pound's failure was not a failure of
liberal sentiment, but rather a failure of courage and integrity. Neverthe-
less, as a result of this lapse, Pound's reputation as a liberal, a reformer,
and the mentor of the new jurisprudential thinkers stood in jeopardy.
Llewellyn's view of Pound probably was influenced by the Sacco
and Vanzetti affair and its aftermath, an attitude reflected in Llewellyn's
attack on Pound's later scholarship in his first Realism article. The at-
tack was focused, however, only on the later Pound (apparently cor-
rupted by his experience as dean). Llewellyn's first Realism article still
acknowledged Pound's early preeminence and influence.11'
Pound's reaction to Llewellyn's original attack had been friendly.
Pound indicated that he had taken no offense from Llewellyn's somewhat
harsh evaluation of his recent work. Indeed, Pound wrote Llewellyn a
congratulatory note. 112 He even admitted that his recent writings may
not have been up to snuff: "May you be spared the necessity of making
bar association addresses and popular talks which falls to the lot of a
voice crying in the wilderness as mine had to be so long. Very likely it
got injured in the process." 1 3 He even applauded Llewellyn and the
other younger scholars who he obviously felt were following in his foot-
steps. He told Llewellyn that "better things are at hand with the on-
coming generation. Veni fortior me post me. ' " 4 Llewellyn was sur-
prised but delighted by Pound's graciousness. Perhaps he thought the
old boy was not entirely lost to the Jurisprudential reformers, though he
had lately shown some conservative tendencies. Llewellyn urged the pio-
neering Progressive-Pragmatist to "pry loose leisure to show us what
skilled irrigation can do to a wilderness." 1 5 The two men were at least
111. Llewellyn, Next Step, supra note 3, at 433-35.
112. Letter from Pound to Llewellyn (April 29, 1930) (Llewellyn Papers, R.XVI.5).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Letter from Llewellyn to Pound, May 1, 1930 (Pound Papers, 24-6).
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partly reconciled and Llewellyn still accepted the older jurisprudent as a
part of the original reformist movement.
B. The Llewellyn-Pound Collaboration
About eight months after this exchange of pleasantries, Alvin John-
son, managing editor of the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences project,
wrote Roscoe Pound, his editorial advisor on law and frequent contribu-
tor, that "we are in a considerable jam over our article on Contract."116
Sometime before, Johnson had asked Pound to write a major piece on
contract law for the Encyclopedia. 117 Pound already had contributed
several articles, including those on Jurisprudence and the American Law
Institute. But this time Pound had to turn Johnson down. The press of
his duties as dean and his work on the Wickersham Commission, made
taking on another scholarly project-for-hire, even for the "handsome"
standard rate of $20 (per article),118 impossible. Rebuffed by Pound,
Johnson decided to ask the rising star of commercial law, Karl Llewel-
lyn, to take on the task. Pound may have recommended Llewellyn him-
self, or Johnson might simply have looked up who was teaching
contracts on the Columbia campus,119 or Llewellyn might have been sug-
gested by either Arthur Corbin or Samuel Williston-the two acknowl-
edged giants of contract law at that time. It is possible that Johnson first
approached either or both of these men to write the piece, but they both
were engaged just then in the monumental American Law Institute Re-
statement project. Cdrbin had been Llewellyn's mentor at Yale, and
Llewellyn fondly called him "Dad." 120 Samuel Williston, the grand old
man of Contracts at Harvard, Langdell's chosen successor, was also fa-
miliar with and apparently fond of the brash young contracts
reformer. 121
116. Letter from Alvin Johnson to Pound (January 12, 1931) (Pound Papers, 13-9).
117. Johnson refers to the earlier solicitation and Pound's response in a later letter from Alvin
Johnson to Pound (Jan. 12, 1931) (Pound Papers, 13-9).
118. See Letter from Alvin Johnson to Pound (Aug. 13, 1929) (Pound Papers, 13-9) (thanking
Pound for two of these articles and mentioning enclosure of a check for $20 for the ALI piece).
119. The Encyclopedia project was headquartered in Fayerweather Hall, across a campus arch-
way from the Columbia Law School.
120. See Corbin-Llewellyn correspondence, Llewellyn Papers, R.III.15.
121. This is not the place to go into the relationship between Llewellyn and Williston, though I
hope someday to write an article reevaluating Williston in which the Llewellyn-Williston correspon-
dence will figure. Briefly, Williston's correspondence with Llewellyn began when Llewellyn re-
viewed Williston's treatise on contracts in 1925. Llewellyn, Book Review, 34 YALE L.J. 454 (1925)
(reviewing S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1925)). Williston wrote to Llewellyn thanking him for his
kind words and also to start a friendly exchange over some mild criticisms Llewellyn had made.
Williston told Llewellyn, that basically he agreed with the younger man, and admired the Columbia
professor's work. Letter from Samuel Williston to Llewellyn (Feb. 16, 1925) (Llewellyn Papers,
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However Llewellyn came to Johnson's attention, the former submit-
ted his 7414 word article (the assignment asked for only 5000 words) on
"Contract" to Johnson in early December, 1930.122 Johnson's problem
was not with the length of the piece; rather, he told Pound that Llewellyn
"treated the subject dynamically but impressionistically. It seems to us
that while his article is excellent as far as it goes, it is weak in its histori-
cal and comparative aspects." 123 In other words, Llewellyn had written
a Realistic article on contract law rather than a conventional survey of
the field.124
Llewellyn attempted, in this encyclopedia article, to convey the cul-
tural and economic function of contract and the symbiotic relationship
between the development of legal institutions and individuals' bargains
or promises. Llewellyn combined cultural anthropology, economic the-
ory and examples from actual business practice to probe the texture and
reality of contract arrangements. He used non-legal materials to address,
in an indirect and subtle way, contemporary technical legal controversies
over promissory estoppel, adhesion contracts, firm offers, and the
equivalency or adequacy of consideration-so indirect and subtle that it
was often impossible to tell where Llewellyn's description ended and his
prescription for reform began. For example, he argued that:
law early serves a prime function in offering means of dealing with
some types of dispute not otherwise adjusted. Along with this goes a
recurrent tendency for law to set itself up as the exclusive means for
dealing with any dispute, if it be appealed to. Law regularly purports
to speak for the group as a whole, which means a pressure to draw into
its orbit any other important institution; it is the other institutions
which offer the stuff of disputes. Finally, rarely until modern times has
expansion of jurisdiction been unprofitable to the lawmen concerned.
The chief countertendency to this expansion is found in law's own for-
malism, and in the traditionalized character of the molds within which
lawmen must move if their action is to have standing as official. Given
then promises present, relied on and broken, law will sooner or later
wrestle with their breach, whether or not the society peculiarly re-
quires such wrestling. 125
R1XXIII.7). Llewellyn, of course, later dedicated his case book on sales to Williston. K. LLEWEL-
LYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES (1930).
122. A carbon of Llewellyn's manuscript with notations of the date received, the number of
words and the number of words assigned noted, is in the Pound Papers, 13-9.
123. Id.
124. Llewellyn's article, only slightly altered, appears as Llewellyn, Contract, 4 ENCYCLOPAE-
DIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 329 (1931). This article is somewhat cryptically written in choppy
sentences and fragments. Llewellyn later published a clearer, less adumbrated (though not substan-
tially different) version of his article. See Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective,
40 YALE L.J. 704 (1931) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Perspective].
125. Llewellyn, Contract, supra note 123, at 331. This quote is typical of the style of the article
which is far from standard encyclopedia fare, The later version in the Yale Law Journal is aptly
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Llewellyn's draft represented his first substantive application of
Legal Realism, but it was hardly a success. 126 He had compressed in-
sights requiring book-length exposition into only a few pages, resulting in
such density of argument and obscurity of allusion that the assigned
topic-contract-suffered near obliteration. Johnson told Pound, "I
think you will agree with me that the article on Contract is so important
that we should make some effort to remedy the situation it has cre-
ated."127 Johnson pleaded with Pound to come to his aid: "You are the
only person who can do an article on the theories of contract within the
three, or at the very most four, weeks within which we shall require
it.' ' 128 Johnson outlined what he had in mind:
Presumably it will deal largely with continental theories although I
suppose a comparison with common law attitudes would be interest-
ing. I should say, perhaps, that we are less interested in the theories
themselves which were often doubtless ill conceived than in the socio-
logical factors of which they were a manifestation. 129
Johnson's request was right up Pound's alley. Pound reveled in synthe-
sizing and comparing continental thinkers to common law theorists.130
Johnson asked for something else as well. He suggested, "In doing
the article I wonder finally if it wouldn't be possible for you to work in
interstitially some of the more technical rules as to the formation and
discharge of contracts by way of showing that no theory fits all of
them."1 31 Apparently (and not surprisingly) Johnson found this another
"weakness" of Llewellyn's contribution. Johnson told Pound, "These
technical rules are also slighted in the article we now have, and while we
are not interested in technicalities as such, I think that they are to a
certain extent essential to a philosophical grasp of contract law."1 32
Johnson seems to have missed the point that Llewellyn had made,
both in his Columbia Law Review article the year before1 33 and in the
manuscript he submitted to Johnson. For Llewellyn, technical rules
lacked importance in the abstract; the crucial thing to understand about
subtitled An Essay in Perspective, since the entire piece is Llewellyn's very personal vision. Llewel-
lyn, Perspective, supra note 124.
126. Indeed, according to Corbin, Llewellyn's mentor, Samuel Williston, did not even under-
stand the expanded version of the Encyclopaedia article, Rhat Price Contract, when the latter ap-
peared in the Yale Law Journal later that year. Letter from Arthur Corbin to Llewellyn, (Aug. 7,
1931) (Llewellyn Papers, R. III. 15).
127. Letter from Alvin Johnson to Roscoe Pound (Jan. 12, 1931) (Pound Papers, 13-9).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
131. Letter from Alvin Johnson to Roscoe Pound (Jan. 12, 1931) (Pound Papers, 13-9).
132. Id.
133. Llewellyn, Next Step, supra note 3.
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contract law was the reality of transactions. Llewellyn deliberately re-
belled against the notion that technical rules were essential to a modem
philosophy of contract law.1 34 As obscure as Llewellyn's piece may have
been, it had attempted to reflect the reality behind the rules.
Johnson told Llewellyn that Pound had been asked to help on the
article by writing some additional sections, but that Pound had advised
Johnson that Llewellyn's piece required more substantive revision. John-
son also told Llewellyn that the Harvard dean would phone him about
collaborating on the revised contribution. 135  Llewellyn agreed with
Johnson's plan and awaited Pound's call. Confusion in Pound's office led
to misunderstanding and Pound never telephoned Llewellyn. 136 Finally,
Llewellyn wrote to Pound.137 Pound, busy as always, reassured Llewel-
lyn that he was willing to help and that "you have the material already in
manuscript for the bulk of an article and that with a few suggestions I
can make, which I hope might appeal to you, it will not be difficult nor
take much time to put together something which would satisfy the edi-
tor's purposes." 138 Pound suggested that they meet in New York to dis-
cuss the matter.
Messages between the two men to arrange a meeting went awry. 139
Pound complained to Johnson that Llewellyn was avoiding him.1 40
Johnson passed on Pound's complaint to Llewellyn, whereupon Llewel-
lyn wrote Pound to ask "wherein I failed to open the road to collabora-
tion." 141 Llewellyn clearly had doubts about a collaboration; he told
Pound that "[i]t is rarely a satisfactory business, at best .... ,,142 Pound
replied that "collaboration is apt to be an awkward matter but [I] had
hoped that our views on many things were so alike that we could probably
134. Llewellyn's manuscript is essentially the same as the published article. See Llewellyn, Con-
tract, supra note 124.
135. Llewellyn recounted his telephone conversation with Johnson in a letter to Pound on Feb.
2, 1931 (Pound Papers, 24-6). He gave a more detailed chronology of events in a letter to Pound a
week later. Letter from Llewellyn to Pound (Feb. 10, 1931).
136. Letter from Pound to Llewellyn (Feb. 4, 1931) (Pound Papers, 24-6). One may speculate,
given the content of Llewellyn's draft, that Pound did not want to collaborate on it at all. Llewel-
lyn's piece was too personal in tone and too idiosyncratic in thesis for Pound to decipher, much less
to join as a co-author. Pound was a master at avoiding confrontation, as the Sacco-Vanzetti affair
bears witness. If my surmise about Pound's reaction to the draft is valid, Pound's inability to con-
tact Llewellyn at crucial times would have been deliberate.
137. Letter from Llewellyn to Pound (Feb. 2, 1931) (Pound Papers, 24-6).
138. Letter from Pound to Llewellyn, (Feb. 4, 1931) (Pound Papers, 24-6).
139. Id.
140. Letter from Llewellyn to Pound (Feb. 10, 1931); Letter from Pound to Llewellyn (Feb. 12,
1931) (Pound Papers, 24-6).
141. Letter from Llewellyn to Pound (Feb. 10, 1931) (Pound Papers, 24-6).
142. Id.
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give Johnson what he wants after a conference." 143 Since the two men
couldn't agree on a time or place to meet, however, Pound recommended
that "if you were willing to let me draw a draft incorporating a good part
of yours I would submit it to you and very likely you and I could agree
on something to appear as a joint project." 144 Llewellyn overcame his
reluctance and wrote back to Pound on February 16, 1931, that "I will
go with you on any such line of collaboration as you suggest. It would be
very interesting to work over the redraft that you speak of." 145 Three
days later Johnson sent Pound Llewellyn's latest version of the article for
Pound to revise. 146
The correspondence between Llewellyn and Pound about the Ency-
clopedia article abruptly ends at this point. Instead of the collaboration
upon which they had finally agreed, the Encyclopedia ultimately pub-
lished an article in two parts, separately authored by Pound and Llewel-
lyn.147 A comparison of Llewellyn's and Pound's independent pieces
show that whereas Pound's comparative and doctrinal analysis took a
more conventional approach than Llewellyn's, it was not terribly out of
touch with nor contradictory of the latter's. They both condemned For-
malism and approved of modem developments in contract law, though
Llewellyn's approach was more imaginative. Their differing approaches
may be illustrated by relating an anecdote from their later correspon-
dence. Llewellyn, an amateur poet, sent Pound a copy of one of his
poems, "The Common Law Tradition." 148 Pound, no poet, wrote to
Llewellyn:
143. Letter from Pound to Llewellyn Feb. 12, 1931 (Pound Papers, 24-6) (emphasis added).
144. Id.
145. Letter from Llewellyn to Pound (Feb. 16, 1931) (Pound Papers, 24-6).
146. Letter from Alvin Johnson to Pound (Feb. 19, 1931) (Pound Papers, 13-9).
147. Llewellyn, Contract, supra note 98, at 323-39. Letter from Pound to Llewellyn (Nov. 10,
1941) (Llewellyn Papers, R.XVI.5) (original) (Pound Papers, 14246, contains a carbon copy).
148. Poem enclosed with letter from Llewellyn to Pound, undated (Pound Papers, 142-46):
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION
Air: Pelagius lived in Carte-No~l.
Come gather and sing to the Common Law
whose twigs and nuts we are,
whether we live by the waggling jaw
or counsel, miles from the Bar.
The wood is good and the sap is strong
that gave us Coke and Hale,
and Right is a battle to win from Wrong,
in spite of contempt and jail.
It calls for brain and it calls for will,
but an acorn knows his mission:
Law is the Oak of Liberty still,
in the Common Law Tradition.
Rowdy-dowdy-doodle-ee-o-
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like everything that comes from your pen, it is lively and pointed. You
certainly have the swing of one of Kipling's ballads. I have never been
tempted to essay verse. Indeed, I am not adapted to write it. But if I
ever did attempt to write in verse about law, I should be tempted to try
the style of Lucretius, and the result would, no doubt, fall very flat.149
While Pound's and Llewellyn's styles of exposition differed, their
views of modem contract law were reconcilable. What happened sud-
denly to derail the collaboration on which they had agreed? Only a few
weeks after Llewellyn agreed to let Pound rework and rewrite his "Con-
tract" article, Pound published his Harvard Law Review critique of the
Realists. All during the time that they had corresponded, Pound never
hinted that he had been working on such a piece. Llewellyn's later con-
In the Common Law Tradition.
Rowdy-dowdy-doodle-ee-o-
In the Common Law Tradition.
John Adams who fought in Faneuil Hall
when the Bell rang down a king
had risked his all on a lawyer's call,
lest England's Prescott swing.
It's learning geared to a zest for deeds
has made our Common Law;
the men she needs are the men she breeds,
men with a fighting jaw.
No Rule was ever enough to halt
corruption or ambition
till manned by lawyers who earn their salt
in the Common Law Tradition.
The names we learned while the mazda burned
put life into the letter -
names of judges who never turned
from making the morrow better;
Cardozo, Ruffin, Burch and Shaw,
and Holmes and Hough and Hand,
to changing need they shaped the Law,
and ever tifeir way shall stand.
Some say our Law's in a sorry plight,
and prey to all perdition.
The answer to that is to set it right,
in the Common Law Tradition.
So sing Brandeis, Ruffin, Burch and Doe,
sing Campbell, Cooley, Cowen,
Amidon, Lumpkin - up they go!
The blind ones sing we down:
Each name that wrought at the mighty Bench
our weal in peace and war
had served like us in the front-line trench:
he fought at the Bar before -
It calls for brain and it calls for will,
but an acorn knows his mission:
Law is the Oak of Liberty still,
in the Common Law Tradition.
149. Id.
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duct and comments indicate that he felt betrayed. °50 He told his mentor
and confidante, Arthur Corbin, "I still can't understand how he could
write the article."' 5'
V. CONCLUSION
The personal breach between Llewellyn and Pound did not last. Af-
ter Llewellyn's "Some Realism-Reply to Pound" article, they resumed
a warm correspondence that continued for nearly two decades. Llewel-
lyn also revised his valuation of Pound. In his courses on Jurisprudence
at Columbia and Chicago, Llewellyn frequently lectured about Pound's
contribution. He told his students "that of all the 20th century jurispru-
dents, Pound was the only one, the only one, who had sense enough to
see that each of these outfits [jurisprudential approaches] had its contri-
bution and to attempt to gather them into a whole- a great contribution
indeed."'1 2 He candidly concluded on another occasion that
Pound is, after all, a terrific figure. You can get mad at him as
hell, as I do, and you can regard him as four times of a self-made s.o.b.
150. Twining recognized Llewellyn's sense of betrayal, but thought it was only because Pound
had sent Llewellyn such a nice note after the Next Step article. W. TWINING, supra note 25, at 72-
73. Collaboration is an intimate relationship. When one author agrees to collaborate with another,
there is, by necessity, a bond created between them not unlike the bond created in marriage. You
place your trust in your coauthor. You feel vulnerable. Betrayal of that trust by public attacks upon
you by your coauthor is akin to discovering the infidelity of your spouse. Llewellyn's perceived
betrayal by his ostensible collaborator, Pound, enraged him. Llewellyn's rage manifested itself in
several ways: When Llewellyn wrote "Some Realism About Realism: A Reply to Dean Pound,"
when he refused to include Pound in his list of Realists, and when he authored the never-published
footnote that denied Pound any connection to the intellectual history of the new Jurisprudence,
Llewellyn was blotting out all that had been between them and restoring some of his self respect.
Llewellyn's actions-the Reply article itself and the unpublished footnote-remind me of a
scene in Paul Mazursky's film, An Unmarried Woman. After Jill Clayburgh's husband, Michael
Murphy, left her for a younger woman, she tore through their apartment throwing out every item
even remotely connected to her unfaithful husband to the extent of tearing off his visage from pic-
tures of the two of them. An Unmarried Woman (Twentieth Century Fox 1977).
I am not unique in comparing Llewellyn's collaborations to marriage. Llewellyn's biographer,
William Twining, compared Llewellyn's later collaboration with E. Adamson Hoebel, with whom he
wrote THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941), to a marriage: "Interdisciplinary matchmakers might learn
something about the conditions of successful collaboration from this unique example of a marriage
between law and anthropology which lasted until the death of one of the partners." W. TWINING,
supra note 36, at 167. Although the "marriage" to Hoebel may have lasted until Llewellyn's death,
that does not mean less permanent collaborations, such as the abortive one with Pound, may not also
be compared to marriage. Not all marriages are permanent; Llewellyn himself had two marriages
end in divorce (to Elizabeth Sanford (married in 1924, divorced in 1930) and Emma Corstvet (mar-
ried in 1933, divorced in 1946)). Id. at 109-10.
151. Letter from Llewellyn to Arthur Corbin (Apr. 6, 1931) (Llewellyn Papers, A.II.65(b)).
152. Llewellyn, Jurisprudence Lectures, Lecture IX (Llewellyn Papers, C.H.1-40).
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in many ways, which he is, and none of that detracts from the great-
ness and from the power that is there.153
Llewellyn's later lectures notwithstanding, the damage to Pound's
reputation and the Progressive-Pragmatic jurisprudential movement he
represented was irreparable. When Llewellyn got "mad at him as hell"
in 1931, Llewellyn effectively rewrote the history of twentieth-century
jurisprudential development. Realism became the focus of attention for
jurisprudential scholars and was portrayed thereafter as the primary
challenger of nineteenth-century Formalism. He eliminated Pound's
Progressive-Pragmatic, anti-Formalist movement as a jurisprudential en-
tity and the stem from which Realistic Jurisprudence itself was really
only an off-shoot. Politics and personality led Llewellyn to kill off Pro-
gressive-Pragmatism and invent Legal Realism.
The history of Jurisprudence is always written in terms of move-
ments and doctrines, but as the contextualist historian will tell you, the
story is lived by real men and women whose ideas and expressions of
those ideas-whether in correspondence or public forums-are predomi-
nantly 'influenced by the conditions of their lives. These conditions in-
clude their involvement in the great intellectual and moral crises of their
times as well as these Jurisprudents' interaction with each other. It is
this dimension which the historian tries to reconstruct from her sources.
New doctrine is thus less a product of prior doctrine in some sort of
genetic mutation, and more a historical artifact of human controversy
and action.
153. Llewellyn, Jurisprudence Lectures, Lecture XII (Apr. 24, 1953) (Llewellyn Papers, C.L.1-
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